

Integrity of candidates, rule of law and good governance

(Parliamentary Elections 2025:
Analysis of candidate lists and
political programs)



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candidate lists and political programs)**

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Coalition of organizations (FOL, IKD dhe INPO)

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1. Executive summary

Since declaring independence in 2008, Kosovo has held five general elections, none of which were conducted within the regular timeframe due to coalition breakdowns and the dissolution of the Assembly. For the first time since independence, on February 9, 2025, Kosovo will hold regular parliamentary elections. These elections will take place under the new General Elections Law, which came into force in July 2023 following a consensus among political parties. For these elections, 28 political entities have been certified, including political parties, coalitions, civic initiatives, and one independent candidate, with a total of 1280 candidates. Among the 28 certified political entities for the 2025 elections, only 13 have made their electoral programs publicly accessible.

The report presents analyses and findings regarding certified candidates with legal issues. It also includes a qualitative analysis of the political programs of the certified entities, focusing on aspects of rule of law, good governance, and human rights. Regarding candidate lists, which include individuals with legal issues, in terms of active indictments and convictions for criminal offenses, three political entities: 1) Vetëvendosje Movement; 2) The AAK-Nisma coalition; and 3) The Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) have included in their lists a total of 23 candidates with legal issues, making up approximately 7% of their total candidates. Vetëvendosje has the highest number, with 14 candidates (12.72% of its list), while the AAK-Nisma coalition has included eight candidates (7.27%), and LDK has one candidate.

Among the 23 candidates with legal issues, 16 face active indictments, while eight have final convictions. In total, 20 indictments have been filed against these candidates for 21 criminal offenses, including corruption-related offenses such as "*Abusing official position or authority*", as well as other criminal offenses, including illegal possession of weapons (five cases), use of a weapon or dangerous tool (nine cases), obstruction or assault against public officials, and other offenses of a criminal nature.

The political party programs on justice for the 2025 elections show significant differences in approach and seriousness. Vetëvendosje Movement addresses justice in only one page of its program and does not refer to the Rule of Law Strategy. It proposes the creation of a Family Court, a Specialized Prosecution Office, and an Office for Disciplinary Investigations, but without an in-depth analysis of their necessity and functionality. The lack of a detailed plan and duplication of existing mechanisms make this program appear unserious.

Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) provides a broader approach to justice, including vetting, integrity of the justice system, restoring the independence of the Free Legal Aid Agency, and digitization of services. However, its program is not based on detailed analyses and does not reference the Rule of Law Strategy. Additionally, some proposals, such as strengthening criteria for the bar exam and judicial appointments, remain vague and lack sufficient justification.

Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK) includes 14 points in its justice chapter, emphasizing anti-corruption strategies and judicial system reform. However, this program also fails to mention the Rule of Law Strategy. It proposes the establishment of a National Bureau of Investigation, but this institution would duplicate the competencies of the Special Prosecution Office and could create excessive oversight of the judiciary. The program also envisions the adoption of a National Strategy for War Crimes and the creation of a Labor Court, but lacks a clear justification for the necessity of such an institution.

The AAK-Nisma coalition prioritizes the rule of law but fails to provide concrete proposals for its implementation. The Coalition for Family's program includes 15 justice-related points, but without elaboration on their implementation. Meanwhile, other parties, such as the New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo and the Fjala Party, address the rule of law in a very general manner without concrete measures.

The electoral programs of major parties for the 2025 elections address topics such as transparency, good governance, public administration, gender equality, and human rights, but most lack clear details on implementation mechanisms and financial resources for proposed reforms. DPK and DLK emphasize transparency and digitization, but fail to explain how these reforms will be implemented. AAK promises economic development and salary increases in public administration, but without a clear budgetary support plan. The Coalition for Family and smaller parties, such as the Egyptian Liberal Party and PDAK-LPB, mention the rule of law and equality, but their programs remain general and lack well-defined implementation strategies.

Vetëvendosje Movement primarily focuses on infrastructure projects, omitting key issues such as public administration, transparency, and accountability. The reform of the public administration system, which was one of the most debated topics during the previous mandate, is not addressed in its electoral program, while the failure to implement the Constitutional Court's ruling on the Law on Salaries in the Public Sector is not mentioned at all.

Overall, most electoral programs lack concrete measures to ensure a depoliticized and efficient public administration. Gender equality and human rights are mentioned in general terms, but without clear measures for their practical implementation. While some programs discuss anti-corruption efforts and strengthening independent institutions, they lack details on concrete mechanisms to ensure accountability and good governance. As a result, most electoral promises remain general and without a well-defined strategy for effective implementation.

2. Methodology

In order to present certified candidates with legal issues and analyze electoral programs in the fields of good governance, human rights, and the rule of law, the coalition of NGOs, including KLI, FOL, and INPO (hereinafter: the coalition), has applied a methodology specifically adapted for the purposes of this report.

This report has been compiled following an analysis of the programs of political entities for the elections of February 9, 2025. Additionally, the candidate lists of these political entities have also been subject to review.

Regarding the electoral programs for these elections, they were collected from the official websites or social media pages of the political entities licensed for the elections of February 9, 2025. In cases where the programs were not publicly available, the coalition sent official emails to the respective entities requesting their programs.¹ This was done to ensure the analysis of the programs of all certified political entities for the 2025 general elections. Therefore, for entities whose programs could not be found or who did not respond to the request, the coalition has considered that these entities do not have a program for these elections.

As for the analysis of these programs, a dedicated chapter provides a general overview and a brief description of the programs, primarily highlighting the thematic areas or key sections where commitments, objectives, measures, or actions are outlined. However, the main focus of the analysis has been on two areas: Rule of Law and Good Governance & Human Rights. A detailed qualitative analysis has been conducted for both areas, and the findings are presented in separate chapters.

Regarding the candidate lists of all certified political entities for these elections, they have been analyzed to determine which candidates have legal issues. In this context, "*legal issues*" refer to individuals who have been convicted of criminal offenses or have active indictments. The findings regarding certified candidates with legal issues have been derived from KLI's monitoring database. However, there is a possibility that additional candidates with legal issues exist but have not been recorded in this database.

Finally, the findings of this report were shared with the certified political entities before its publication. None of them submitted any comments.

¹ **Note:** Independent candidate Fatmir Bytyqi has not been contacted. No political program or contact email has been found for him in the contact list published by the KQZ.

3. The elections of 2025

Since the declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo on February 17, 2008, five general elections have been held. However, due to the inability to complete a full four-year mandate, none of these elections have been conducted in a regular manner.

Therefore, the elections scheduled for February 9, 2025, will be the first regular general elections since Kosovo's independence. These elections will be conducted under the new Law on General Elections, which entered into force in July 2023 following a broad consensus among political parties in the Assembly of Kosovo.

For the February 9, 2025 elections, the application period for certification was open from September 1, 2024, to December 11, 2024. During this period, 28 political entities applied to the Central Election Commission (CEC), representing a total of 1280 candidates. Among these political entities, 20 were political parties, five were coalitions, two were citizen initiatives, and one was an independent candidate.²

The certification of political entities for participation in these elections was decided by the CEC in two separate meetings. During the meeting held on December 18, 2024, the CEC certified 11 political entities, comprising a total of 606 candidates. Subsequently, on December 31, 2024, the CEC certified an additional 17 political entities, representing 674 candidates. As a result, a total of 28 political entities with 1,280 candidates were certified for these elections.³

However, a contentious issue arose during the certification process regarding the non-certification of the Serbian List on December 23, 2024. The opposition to certifying the Serbian List came from Vetëvendosje Movement representatives in the CEC, Sami Kurteshi and Alban Krasniqi. Despite the Office for Registration and Certification of Political Entities recommending the certification of this political entity, the CEC did not certify it on December 23, 2024. This decision sparked significant public debate, as the Serbian List had already passed the verification process by the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora (MFAD), and the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP).^{4 5}

2 "Deadline Concludes: 28 Political Entities with 1,280 Candidates Apply for Certification to Participate in the Elections for the Assembly of Kosovo."; Central Election Commission. December 12, 2024; (See link: <https://kqz-ks.org/permbillet-afati-28-subjekte-politike-me-1280-kandidate-aplikojne-per-certifikim-per-pjesemarrje-ne-zgjedhjet-per-kuvendin-e-kosoves/>).

3 "CEC Completes Certification of 28 Political Entities and 1,280 Candidates for Participation in the Elections for the Assembly of Kosovo."; Central Election Commission. December 31, 2024; (See link: <https://kqz-ks.org/kqz-permbille-certifikim-in-e-28-subjekteve-politike-dhe-1280-kandidateve-per-pjesemarrje-ne-zgjedhjet-per-kuvendin-e-kosoves/>).

4 Non-certification by the CEC – The Serbian List has 48 hours to appeal to the ECAP; if the case is dismissed, it proceeds to the Supreme Court." Gazeta Express, December 24, 2024. (See link: <https://www.gazetaexpress.com/moscertifikimi-nga-kqz-lista-serbe-ka-48-ore-kohe-te-ankohet-ne-pzap-nese-rrezohet-rasti-shkon-ne-supreme/>).

5 Legal battle between LVV and the Serbian List." Radio Free Europe, January 3, 2025. (See link: <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/beteja-ligjore-mes-lvv-dhe-liste-serbe/33262459.html>).

The United States of America, the European Union, and Germany expressed concern and regret over the non-certification of the Serbian List.⁶

However, on December 25, 2024, the ECAP ruled to annul the CEC's decision and ordered the certification of the Serbian List along with its 48 candidates.⁷ In its decision, the ECAP stated that, in this case, the political entity in question had submitted a complete application in accordance with the Law on General Elections. Furthermore, it emphasized that the CEC is obligated to certify any political entity that meets the legal requirements.⁸

Following this ruling, LVV filed an appeal with the Supreme Court of Kosovo, which dismissed the appeal as inadmissible.⁹ Thus, the CEC certified the Serbian List in the meeting held on December 31, 2024. Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy welcomed the decision, emphasizing that all parties and candidates must reject any attempt to politicize the electoral process.¹⁰

6 "The West expresses concern over the non-certification of the Serbian List." Radio Free Europe, December 23, 2024. (See link: <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/shbaq-thellessisht-e-shqetuar-nga-moscertifikimi-i-listes-serbe/33250482.html>).

7 "CEC completes the certification of 28 political entities and 1,280 candidates for participation in the Elections for the Assembly of Kosovo." Central Election Commission, December 31, 2024. (See link: <https://kqz-ks.org/kqz-permbylle-certifikimin-e-28-subjekteve-politike-dhe-1280-kandidateve-per-pjesemarrje-ne-zgjedhjet-per-kuvendin-e-kosoves/>).

8 "ECAP orders the CEC to certify the Serbian List for elections." Radio Free Europe, December 25, 2024. (See link: <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/pzap-certifikim-lista-serbe-/33252812.html>).

9 "Supreme Court rejects LVV's appeal against ECAP's order for the certification of the Serbian List." Radio Free Europe. (See link: <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/supremja-hedh-poshte-ankese-vv-lista-serbe/33259196.html>).

10 "The official page of the U.S. Embassy in Pristina on the social network 'X'." (See link: <https://x.com/USEmbPristina/status/1874120365477122184>).

4. Political programs

Through political programs, political entities or parties present their vision for governance. Generally, these political programs are unveiled to the electorate at the start of the election campaign. This allows the public to see what policies the political entities will pursue, what they stand for during their governance, and what their priorities will be.

However, despite their perceived importance, not all political entities provide such a document to the electorate.

Out of 28 certified political entities, the coalition has managed to obtain the programs of only 13 of them for the 2025 elections. Below, you will find tables listing the political entities that have presented a program for these elections and those that have not.

No Political parties with a program	No Political parties without program
1 Lëvizja VETËVENDOSJE	1 Kosova Demokratik Turk Partisi
2 Partia Demokratike e Kosovës – PDK	2 Koalicija Vakrat
3 Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës – LDK	3 PARTIA E ASHKALINJËVE PËR INTEGRIM
4 IRDK – Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosovës	4 NOVA DEMOKRATSKA STRANKA
5 Jedinstvena Goranska Partija	5 PARTIA ROME E BASHKUAR E KOSOVËS
6 Za Slobodu Pravdu i Opstanak	6 Yenilikçi Türk Hareket Partisi
7 AAK – Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës, Nisma – Nisma Socialdemokrate, Lista Konservatore, Forumi intelektual – E – 30	7 GRADJANSKA INICIJATIVA NARODNA PRAVDA
8 FJALA	8 Partia Balli Kombëtar Demokrat Shqiptar
9 PARTIA LIBERALE EGJIPTIANE – PLE	9 Kosova Adalet Türk Partisi
10 SRPSKA DEMOKRATIJA	10 Opre Roma Kosova
11 Koalicioni për Familje	11 FATMIR BYTYQI
12 PDAK – LPB	12 SRPSKA LISTA
13 Naša Bošnjačka Koalicija (Naša Inicijativa i Bošnjačka stranka)	13 Srpski narodni pokret
	14 Partija kosovskih Srba
	15 SOCIJALDEMOKRATSKA UNIJA – SDU

TABLE 1 Political parties with a program (left) and those without a program

▶ Vetëvendosje Movement

“Lëvizja Vetëvendosje” (eng: Vetëvendosje Movement) has presented a 63-page program. Regarding their commitments and policies, this document is divided into 25 chapters. Among these chapters, 13 contain specific points or subchapters, totaling 34 in total. These include chapters covering justice, infrastructure, energy and mining, water resources, healthcare, education, students, workers, women, children, public transport, innovation and technology, and production/entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, 12 chapters do not contain specific points or subchapters. These chapters address public finance, Brezovica, the diaspora, agriculture, capital projects, municipalities, sports, arts, cultural heritage, security, defense, and foreign policy and European integration.

▶ Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK)

In a 62-page program, this political entity states that their development plan revolves around five key objectives: 1) Sustainable economic development; 2) A better life for everyone; 3) Education for the future; 4) A healthcare system centered on patients; 5) A secure and integrated Kosovo. The program outlines a total of 212 proposed actions across various sectors, including economic development, the labor market, family affairs, electricity, mining, agriculture, education, healthcare, the environment, justice reform, public administration, security issues, arts and culture, tourism, and sports. Additionally, the program addresses foreign policy, structured into subcategories covering diplomacy, European integration, the diaspora, pan-Albanian integration, and normalization of relations with Serbia.

► Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK)

The Democratic League of Kosovo has unveiled a 248-page program. Through a chapter outlining the governance program, DLK has emphasized 22 key points. These points relate to economy and finance, energy, digitization and information technology, infrastructure, family and welfare, healthcare, education, defense, law and order, justice, and Euro-Atlantic integration. Furthermore, these points include foreign policy, sports, spatial planning and the environment, agriculture, culture, public administration, local governance, the diaspora, trade and industry, social and pension policy, and the financial sector. In each of these areas, DLK has also presented its objectives, specifically 165 objectives in total.

► AAK, Social Democratic Initiative (Nisma), Conservative List, and Forum E30

This coalition, through a 101-page program, has presented six programmatic priorities: 1) Direct NATO accession – Membership action plan; 2) Democratic and institutional consolidation; 3) State image-building and profiling; 4) Economic development; 5) Social solidarity and support; 6) Family. Meanwhile, measures and actions have been presented in 20 different points. These measures and actions are outlined for NATO accession, EU integration, institutional and democratic consolidation, state image-building, economic development, macroeconomic and fiscal policies. Furthermore, measures and actions have also been described for reducing informality and tax evasion, tax relief, anti-corruption measures, employment, electricity, the food industry and agriculture, tourism, infrastructure, the environment, healthcare, information and communication technology, and education. At the very end of the program, a summary of commitments, consisting of 55 points, is highlighted.

▶ **New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo**

This political entity has offered a 34-page program. The program contains eight main pillars, emphasizing a focus on the integration of the Egyptian community and all citizens. These pillars concern economic integration and social support reform; education, learning, and gender equality; improvement of housing conditions; employment in the public and private sector; healthcare and welfare; support for culture and identity preservation; support for basic infrastructure; and subsidies for farmers.

▶ **Fjala**

The Fjala entity, through a 15-page program, has presented 15 fields, outlining its commitments through these fields. These fields are categorized as 1) Economy; 2) Education; 3) Healthcare; 4) Energy; 5) Welfare and family; 6) Justice; 7) Agriculture; 8) Law and security; 9) Foreign policy; 10) Environment and spatial planning; 11) Social and pension policies; 12) Financial sector; 13) Culture; and 14) Diaspora. Additionally, for each of them, specific subpoints have been presented, totaling 89 in total.

▶ **Coalition – Democratic Party of Ashkali of Kosovo (PDAK) and Movement for Co-Action (LPB)**

In a 15-page program, this coalition emphasizes that it will focus on seven key points. According to this program, the focus points of this coalition relate to rule of law, education and schooling, healthcare and social welfare, economic development and employment, sustainable housing and infrastructure, culture, youth and sports, and gender equality.

► The Family Coalition

The Family Coalition has presented a 104-page program. At the beginning of this program, the Family Coalition has introduced the principles of the program for the February 9, 2025 elections. These principles are divided into 10 different points. Among other things, these principles include preserving and advancing the constitutional order; building a democratic rule-of-law state with separate and balanced legislative, executive, and judicial powers, as well as a constitutional system that prevents non-principled conflicts among them, ensuring the free expression of citizens' opinions. It also includes supporting the full exercise of the oversight function of the Kosovo Assembly over the government and other executive bodies established by it. As principles of this program, it also includes protection of fundamental freedoms by combating all forms of discrimination; rule of law with a firm stance against theft and crime; strengthening and empowerment of security structures; advancement of the educational system; healthcare system reform; systematic economic development; and raising national awareness, preserving values, and improving living standards. The program is divided into five main points: 1) Family; 2) Education, Science, Technology, and Culture; 3) Healthcare and social reform; 4) Development and Integration; and 5) Security and Justice.

► Serbian Democracy

This political entity has presented a short program consisting of only seven points. In six of them, specific initiatives related to the Serbian community are highlighted. Among other things, they guarantee support and security for Serbian citizens. They also promise to exert pressure on the Ministry for Communities and Returns to work towards the return of Serbs to Kosovo. Additionally, they commit to stopping the departure of Serbs through a fairer distribution of funds allocated to Serbian areas in Kosovo. Furthermore, the program states that they will insist on the complete removal of the ban on the import of Serbian goods and press, and that they will maintain ties with Belgrade on a technical rather than political level. Meanwhile, in the seventh point, they have presented eight additional initiatives.

▶ **Party for Freedom, Justice, and Survival**

Through a 12-page program, this entity has presented 10 points or chapters in which they commit to working. Among them are personal freedoms and rights, decentralization, economy, education, minority communities and return of displaced persons, and greater inclusion and a more active role of Serbian representatives in Kosovo in matters related to their rights and general welfare in Kosovo. Additionally, the program highlights political independence, emphasizing that representatives of this party will not follow external influences, whether from Belgrade or Brussels. At the end of the program, employment-related issues are also included, particularly through professional qualifications and micro-businesses.

▶ **Egyptian Liberal Party**

The 3-page program of the Egyptian Liberal Party presents 11 topics, which include goals related to education, strengthening democracy, freedoms and human rights, employment, healthcare, welfare, economic development, agriculture and livestock, infrastructure, women, youth, culture, sports and media, and the diaspora. Meanwhile, one of the topics includes seven points related to the identity of the Egyptian community.

▶ **United Gorani Party**

This entity has prepared a one-page program. It briefly describes 10 points in which it will engage. Through these points, the United Gorani Party (JGP) emphasizes its advocacy for preserving and developing the Gorani community, focusing on the preservation of tradition, uniqueness, and identity.

The party aims to address citizens' daily challenges by promoting transparency in employment, regional representation, and affirmative action for youth and women. Furthermore, the program states that the party supports the creation of a pro-European, multicultural, and multiethnic Kosovo, with a strong emphasis on protecting the rights of workers, farmers, pensioners, as well as ensuring free access to social and healthcare services, education, and employment opportunities.

► Our Bosnian Coalition

Our Bosniak Coalition has presented a 24-page program. Through a dedicated chapter addressing issues and solutions, it highlights: the absence of a Bosniak municipality, decentralization, and the creation of temporary solutions.

Additionally, five other chapters focus on: education, culture, and identity; the economy in Bosniak-populated areas; the protection of Bosniak identity, language, tradition, and culture; youth, sports, and the arts; and environmental protection. Each of these chapters also includes subheadings that provide a more detailed discussion of these topics.

5. Purity of Electoral Lists

The fact that the Assembly is the legislative institution of the Republic of Kosovo highlights the importance of ensuring that it is not composed of individuals with legal issues, particularly those facing active indictments or convictions for various criminal offenses.

Unfortunately, such a phenomenon is likely to continue in the next legislature, as some political parties persist in including candidates with legal issues in their electoral lists. By doing so, they provide the public with the option of electing such individuals as their representatives, demonstrating an ongoing lack of political will for decriminalization¹¹.

Among the 28 certified political entities, three have included candidates with legal issues in their lists for parliamentary elections. These are the Vetëvendosje Movement, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and the AAK-Nisma coalition.

Together, these three political entities have a total of 23 candidates with legal issues, either facing active indictments or having prior convictions. This means that 7% of the 330 candidates presented by these parties have legal problems.

The political entity with the highest number of candidates facing legal issues is Vetëvendosje, with 14 candidates on its list, representing 12.7% of its total candidates.

Meanwhile, the AAK-Nisma coalition has included eight candidates with legal issues, constituting 7.3% of their list—five from the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and three from Nisma.

The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) has included one candidate with legal issues in its list.

¹¹ Shala, G. and Smajli, F. "Government with clean hands and investigation of government corruption". Kosovo Law Institute. December 2024. (See: <https://kli-ks.org/qeverisja-me-duar-te-pastra-dhe-hetimi-i-korrupsionit-qeveritar/>).

5.1. Candidates with active indictments

Out of the 23 candidates with legal issues, 16 are currently facing active indictments, while eight have been convicted of criminal offenses.¹²

Among these 16 candidates, three have more than one active indictment, bringing the total number of active indictments to 20 and the total number of criminal offenses to 21.

The criminal offenses against these candidates vary in nature. In addition to corruption-related offenses such as abuse of official position or authority, the indictments also include four other types of criminal offenses, *"use of a weapon or dangerous tool"*, *"unauthorized possession, control, or ownership of weapons"*, *"obstruction of an official person in the performance of official duties"* and *"assault on an official person"*.

The most common criminal offense among these candidates is *"Use of a weapon or dangerous tool,"* which appears in nine cases. This is followed by *"abuse of official position or authority"* in six cases and *"unauthorized possession, control, or ownership of weapons"* in five cases.

Meanwhile, *"obstruction of an official person in the performance of official duties"* and *"assault on an official person"* each appear in one case.

The table below lists all parliamentary candidates facing active indictments, along with their political affiliation and the criminal offenses they are accused of.

¹² Note: One of the candidates appears both in the list of candidates with convictions and in the list of candidates with active indictments.

Name and Surname	Political entity (party)	Number of cases	Criminal Offense	When indictment was filed
Albulena Haxhiu	LVV	1	Unauthorized possession, control, or ownership of weapons	2016
Arbërije Nagavci	LVV	1	Unauthorized possession, control, or ownership of weapons	2019
Besnik Krasniqi	AAK-Nisma	1	Abuse of official position or authority	2023
Drita Millaku	LDK	1	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2019
Endrit Shala	AAK-Nisma	1	Abuse of official position or authority	2024
Fitore Pacolli – Dalipi	LVV	1	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2019
Glauk Konjufca	LVV	2	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2016
			Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2016
Jetmire Vrenezi	LVV	1	Abuse of official position or authority	2019
Nuredin Lushtaku	AAK-Nisma	2	Assault on an official person	2022
			Abuse of official position or authority	2019
Pal Lekaj	AAK-Nisma	3	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2015
			Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2016
			Abuse of official duty	2022
Sali Zyba	LVV	1	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2019
Teuta Haxhiu	AAK-Nisma	1	Unauthorized possession, control, or ownership of weapons	2016
Time Kadrijaj	AAK-Nisma	1	Unauthorized possession, control, or ownership of weapons	2016
Valon Ramadani	LVV	1	Obstruction of an official person in the performance of official duties	2019
			Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2019
Vesel Krasniqi	AAK-Nisma	1	Abuse of official position or authority	2024
Xhelal Sveçla	LVV	1	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2019

TABLE 2 Candidates with active indictments

5.2. Candidates with convictions

On the other hand, among the eight parliamentary candidates with convictions, one has been convicted in two separate cases for different criminal offenses. Three of these candidates have been convicted of corruption-related offenses, specifically for *failure to report or false reporting of assets*. Four candidates have been convicted for *use of a weapon or dangerous tool*. Additionally, one candidate has been convicted of *assault on an official person and threatening behavior*.

The majority of these candidates belong to the Vetëvendosje Movement, with seven individuals on its list. Meanwhile, one candidate is on the AAK-Nisma coalition list.

Name and Surname	Political entity (Party)	Number of cases	Criminal offense	Year	Conviction
Albin Kurti	LVV	1	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2018	Unique: 1 year and 6 months of suspended imprisonment
			Obstruction of an official person in the performance of official duties		
Albulena Haxhiu	LVV	1	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2018	Unique: 1 and 3 months of suspended imprisonment
			Obstruction of an official person in the performance of official duties		
Hydajet Hyseni – Kaloshi	LVV	1	Failure to report or false reporting of assets, income, gifts, other material benefits, or financial obligations	2022	500 euro fine
Ismail Kurteshi	LVV	1	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2021	4 months of suspended imprisonment
Liza Gashi	LVV	1	Failure to report or false reporting of assets, income, gifts, other material benefits, or financial obligations	2023	500 euro fine
Mytaher Haskuka	LVV	1	Use of a weapon or dangerous tool	2022	1 year of suspended imprisonment
Rozeta Hajdari	LVV	1	Failure to report or false reporting of assets, income, gifts, other material benefits, or financial obligations	2022	700 euro fine
Zafir Berisha	AAK -Nisma	2	Assault on an official person	2024	1,500 euro fine
			Threat	2022	600 euro fine

TABLE 3 Candidates with convictions for criminal offenses

The candidates listed above have been assessed in this report as individuals who have legal issues, meaning they either have active indictments or have been convicted for criminal offenses. However, this does not imply that they are legally prohibited from being part of the candidate lists. This is because such prohibitions are specifically outlined in the General Elections Law. In this law, among other restrictions, it is emphasized that a person who has been convicted in the last three years with a final court judgment for a criminal offense, and sentenced to one or more years of effective imprisonment, cannot run in elections.

However, despite this, the criminalization of politics, in terms of individuals with legal issues holding significant state positions, does not align with the principles of good governance.

The issue of good governance has also been addressed by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). This convention emphasizes the obligation that: Each state party, to the extent that it is consistent with the fundamental principles of its legal system, should consider procedures through which a public official, accused of a criminal offense covered by this Convention, may, if appropriate, be removed, suspended, or reassigned by the competent authority, with due regard for the principle of presumption of innocence. The convention also includes provisions that require the removal of convicted individuals.

6. Rule of Law in Political Programs

6.1. Vetëvendosje Movement

On page 49 of the Vetëvendosje Movement's Political Program, justice is addressed. However, justice is covered in only this single page. Both in terms of how the program was presented—published late and with only one page of content—and in terms of the promises made, the Vetëvendosje Movement's program on justice appears to be unserious.

The program does not reference the Rule of Law Strategy, a strategy that was adopted following the Functional Review of the Rule of Law Sector.¹³

The first point is the establishment of a **Family Court**. The justification for this court's creation is based on the time it takes to handle family cases, but there is no specific analysis provided to explain why such a court is needed. In fact, aside from a general assessment, the program does not examine the issues within family cases or the necessity of creating such a court.

The second point in the program is the creation of a new Specialized Prosecutor's Office. This proposal lacks any clarification, especially given that Kosovo already has a Special Prosecutor's Office (SPRK). In fact, two (2) laws for the SPRK have been adopted within this legislature. The proposal to establish such a prosecutor's office seems to lack seriousness.

The establishment of the Office for Disciplinary Investigations is the third and final point in the justice program of the Vetëvendosje Movement: "*The office will be responsible for handling complaints and allegations of inappropriate conduct by judges and prosecutors. The disciplinary process could also be initiated ex officio. The office will gather evidence and present cases before the Disciplinary Committees of the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) and the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC),*" the program states. An almost identical office, called the Office of the Disciplinary Prosecutor, has existed in Kosovo. Its failure to provide accountability led to a change in the accountability system for judges and prosecutors, according to Law No. 06/L-057 on Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges and Prosecutors.

13 Shala, G., Kolaj, A., Jakaj, N. and Kolshi, M. "Strategy at crossroads". Kosovo Law Institute. June 2024. (See: <https://kli-ks.org/strategjia-ne-udhekryq/>); Zekaj, E., Makshana, L., Shala, G. and Jakaj, N. "(Non) Implementation of the Rule of Law Strategy in Practice". Kosovo Law Institute. October 2023. (See: <https://kli-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Mos-Zbatimi-i-Strategjise-se-Sundimit-te-Ligjit-ne-Praktike-1.pdf>).

On the other hand, it should be noted that this promise also seems to be insincere. Currently, the Ministry of Justice has submitted a draft law to the Venice Commission for amendments to Law No. 06/L-057 on Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges and Prosecutors.¹⁴ This draft law aims to reform the existing system, but the establishment of a new office is not mentioned anywhere in the draft.

6.2. Democratic League of Kosovo

On pages 136-147 of the LDK Program Plan, justice is addressed. In this section, the LDK Program Plan mentions issues in the field of rule of law, vetting in the justice system, the integrity of the justice system, political killings, etc.¹⁵

One positive aspect is the commitment to the development of the vetting process, in line with the opinions of the Venice Commission regarding this process in Kosovo.¹⁶ The program plan emphasizes that the vetting process will be carried out through constitutional amendments, followed by the adoption of necessary laws to strengthen the justice system. Another important aspect is the promise to restore the independence of the Agency for Free Legal Aid, as it was until 2022.¹⁷ Additionally, the commitment to ensuring the stability of salaries in the justice system is another positive point of this program plan.¹⁸ Equally important is the focus on the digitization of justice services, which represents a step towards modernization and improving efficiency.

However, it should be emphasized that, regarding the identified issues, this program does not primarily follow an evidence-based approach. In other words, the problems are mentioned in general terms, but there is a lack of specific and detailed analysis of the concrete challenges faced by the rule of law in Kosovo. Furthermore, unfortunately, the plan does not mention the Strategy for the Rule of Law at all, which came out of one of the most important processes in this field, the Functional Review of the Rule of Law Sector.

Moreover, when discussing integrity in the justice system, the Political Program emphasizes the need for: 1) strengthening the criteria for the bar exam, 2) strengthening the criteria for selecting judges and prosecutors, 3) changing the composition of the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) so that 2/3 of the judges are from the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and 4) increasing the number of judges, prosecutors, and supporting staff.¹⁹

14 Venice Commission. "1220/2024 - Opinion on the draft law on recruitment, performance evaluation, integrity control, and status of judges and prosecutors, and the draft law amending the Law on the disciplinary liability of judges and prosecutors". (See: <https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?opinion=1220&year=all>).

15 *Political Program of the Democratic League of Kosovo for the 2025 general parliamentary elections*, page 136-147.

16 Venice Commission. "Kosovo Opinion On The Concept Paper On The Vetting Of Judges And Prosecutors And Draft Amendments To The Constitution Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 131st Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 June 2022)". Strasbourg, June 20, 2022. (See: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2022\)011-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2022)011-e)).

17 Shala, G. "Tendencies for politicizing the IOBCK". Kosovo Law Institute. Pristina. October 2022. (See: https://kli-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Draft-Raporti_Tendencat-per-nderhyrje-kunderkushetuese-ne-KPMSHCK-PDF-1.pdf).

18 Kosovo Law Institute. "Wages in the public sector". December 2022. (See: https://kli-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/IKD_Projektligjin-per-Pagat-ne-Sektorin-Publik-1.pdf).

19 *Political Program of the Democratic League of Kosovo for the 2025 general parliamentary elections*, page 136-147.

As for strengthening the criteria for the jurisprudence exam, it remains unclear what is meant by this initiative. It is not clear which specific criteria will be strengthened and on what basis this conclusion was reached. So far, there is no study that highlights the need for such a change, nor does the LDK's Political Program provide any details in this regard. Additionally, the issue of the criteria for selecting judges and prosecutors remains unclear. To ensure the proper process in their recruitment, the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) and the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council (KPC) should be empowered with adequate legal mechanisms. This need has also been highlighted by the Venice Commission.

Regarding the proposal to re-composition the KJC with at least 2/3 of members from the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, it should be emphasized that the current legislation regulates this issue. According to the law, of the seven (7) members representing the judiciary, two (2) come from the Supreme Court, two (2) from the Court of Appeals, and three (3) from the Basic Courts. This composition represents 57.1% of members from the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, which is very close to 2/3 (66.66%). On the other hand, it should be noted that the number of judges in the Basic Courts is significantly higher than that of judges in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, justifying the higher representation of the Basic Courts. As for the members of the KJC elected by the Assembly, this matter is regulated by the Constitution. Any change in this direction would require constitutional amendments, a complicated process that demands extensive preparation. Thus, this proposal in the Political Program remains unclear.

Regarding the number of judges, the Political Program does not provide any analysis on how much this increase should be. However, it is clear that, directly, the number of judges is not related to the integrity of the justice system, but to its efficiency.

The Political Program foresees the establishment of a State Center for Investigations. However, it is proposed that this be done after the completion of the vetting process. It is unclear whether one government mandate is sufficient for this.

In the justice program, the LDK Political Program also lists the issue of political murders.²⁰ In this regard, it should be emphasized that the demand of this political entity, like that of the entire Kosovo society, for the clarification of these murders is legitimate. However, the handling of these cases remains within the competence of the justice system institutions, and a political program cannot make promises regarding this issue (as it did not). Even less so should this matter be included under the justice chapter.

As for the treatment of war crimes, the LDK does not present any vision on this issue, except for its commitment to engage in this area.

20 Frrokaj, J. and Hashani, G. "Treatment of murders in Kosovo". Kosovo Law Institute. April 2021. (See: https://kli-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/IKD_Trajtimi-i-vrasjeve-ne-Kosove.pdf).

6.3. Democratic Party of Kosovo

In pages 37-40 of the PDK's Program, the chapter "Reformed Justice for Kosovo" is presented. Within this chapter, the PDK's program includes a total of 14 points.²¹

First, it should be emphasized that the omission of the Rule of Law Strategy is highly problematic, as this strategy has emerged from one of the most important processes in this area, namely the Functional Review of the Rule of Law Sector.²²

Initially, the PDK's Program emphasizes the adoption of an Anti-Corruption Strategy and the strengthening of policies and mechanisms to combat corruption.²³ A positive aspect is the intention to review legislation and policies that enable efficient combat against corruption. The development of the vetting process in accordance with the Venice Commission's²⁴ opinion also represents a real need for the justice system.

Equally positive is the plan to reduce the workload in the judicial system, particularly with civil cases, by fulfilling obligations that arise from applicable laws and collective agreements.²⁵ The drafting of a "special strategy to reduce the number of cases in courts, which will also review the appointment system within administrative bodies, so that courts are not overloaded with cases" is considered a fully appropriate action to respect human rights and empower the judiciary to ensure the right to a trial within a reasonable time. For this, the Program also highlights the need to evaluate the need to increase the number of judges.

The PDK's Program aims to establish a National Bureau of Investigation. According to this Program, "The characteristic of this new institution, which will consist of no more than ten specialized prosecutors, will be a judicial police force that will handle all cases where there are suspicions of abuse of office or when judges, prosecutors, and judicial and prosecutorial support staff violate the law. This mechanism will also be competent to handle high-level corruption cases when the Special Prosecutor's Office (SPRK) does not take action within its jurisdiction". In the way it is presented, this Bureau is not an adequate proposal. Initially, in the way it is presented, this Bureau would be a kind of "criminal offense supervisor" of the prosecutorial and judicial system and a subsidiary Prosecutor's Office in cases where the Special Prosecutor's Office (SPRK) does not act. This approach represents a duplication of institutional responsibilities, which is a counterproductive approach. Furthermore, it is envisioned that this body would also conduct investigations into unjustifiable wealth, a term that refers to civil-based confiscation. This goal is unclear.

21 2025 Electoral Program; Kosovo Can Do Better; Bedri Hamza for Prime Minister, page 37-40

22 Shala, G., Kolaj, A., Jakaj, N. and Kolshi, M. "Strategy at crossroads". Kosovo Law Institute. June 2024. (See: <https://kli-ks.org/strategjia-ne-udhekrq/>); Zekaj, E., Makshana, L., Shala, G. and Jakaj, N. "(Non) Implementation of the Rule of Law Strategy in Practice". Kosovo Law Institute. October 2023. (See: <https://kli-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Mos-Zbatimi-i-Strategjise-se-Sundimit-te-Ligjit-ne-Praktike-1.pdf>).

23 Shala, G. "The Saga of the Anti-Corruption Strategy". Kosovo Law Institute. January 2025. (See: <https://kli-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Raporti-final-Saga-e-Strategjise-kunder-Korrupsion-2.pdf>).

24 Venice Commission. "Opinion On The Concept Paper On The Vetting Of Judges And Prosecutors And Draft Amendments To The Constitution Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 131st Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 June 2022)". Strasbourg. June 20 2022. (See: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2022\)011-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2022)011-e)).

25 Kosovo Law Institute and students of the KLI Legal Aid Center "Kosovo's Unpaid Jubilee Salaries". September 2024. (See: <https://kli-ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/IKD-Kosto-e-pagave-jubilar-te-papaguara-2.pdf>).

On the other hand, the lack of adequate prosecution of corruption is not due to the lack of institutional mechanisms. It is primarily the result of the corporatization of the KPC.²⁶ According to the Constitution, an organ like this, made up of prosecutors, should be part of the prosecutorial system. Therefore, regardless of its name, it simply represents another prosecutorial office that duplicates institutional competencies.

Regarding war crimes, the PDK program includes a specific action: the adoption of a National Strategy for War Crimes. Such a strategy has consistently been lacking in Kosovo, and such planning is considered appropriate for addressing war crimes cases.

As for labor disputes, the Program aims to establish a Labor Court. However, the program lacks an analysis of why such a court is necessary and why the issues in this sector cannot be addressed within the regular courts. Simply establishing a specialized court in a particular field does not solve the problem in that field.

6.4. AAK – Nisma Coalition

According to the Program of the AAK-NISMA coalition, "Rule of law has been set as the main priority of governance." In the Program of this coalition, the implementation of several "levels of policies" is mentioned, such as "Accountability in the rule of law – Restoring dignity and the independence of rule of law institutions; Effective institutional responsibility; Independent justice; Direct interventions in public policies of rule of law and justice."²⁷ However, regarding the rule of law, the Program does not offer concrete proposals on how this coalition would approach the rule of law.

The proposal in the AAK-Nisma coalition's Program that "a regular consultation platform, open to the public, will be created with institutions fighting organized crime and corruption to identify difficulties" is unclear. The strengthening of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (referred to as the Anti-Corruption Agency) is mentioned without being accompanied by any concrete proposal.²⁸ Other actions related to the rule of law or the fight against corruption are also mentioned in a general manner.²⁹

26 Shala, G. dhe Kabashi, F. " *What corporatism and impunity look like in the prosecutorial system*". Kosovo Law Institute. December 2024. (See: [file:///C:/Users/ikd20/Downloads/Final-Draft-raporti-Si-duket-korporatizmi-dhe-pandeshkueshmeria-ne-sistem-in-prokurorial-FINAL%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/ikd20/Downloads/Final-Draft-raporti-Si-duket-korporatizmi-dhe-pandeshkueshmeria-ne-sistem-in-prokurorial-FINAL%20(1).pdf)).

27 Electoral Program 2025 of the AAK - Nisma Coalition, p.25-26.

28 Ibid, p.28.

29 Ibid, p. 28 and 47-49.

6.5. Justice in other programs

The Coalition for the Family's Program lists 15 points related to justice. However, the Program does not elaborate on the meaning or implementation of these points. Among these points are the vetting process, a "digital system for notaries to access personal data to protect legal heirs, particularly women, from vulnerabilities in inheritance," and the "legal determination of a budget for financial compensations for meal allowances, jubilee salaries, and the thirteenth salary for public sector employees, to relieve courts from reviewing thousands of such cases," among others. Meanwhile, some points are presented in a general manner without specifying concrete measures in the field of rule of law, such as "A firm commitment against crime to enhance citizens' security" and "Reforms aimed at reducing corruption," etc.³⁰.

The program of the New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo does not include a plan related to issues concerning the rule of law. Our Bosniak Coalition, The Political Program of the Egyptian Liberal Party 2025, The Political Program of the Egyptian Liberal Party 2025, The United Gorani Party, The Electoral Program of Serbian Democracy.

The political program of PDAK-LPB only mentions, in principle, the importance of the rule of law and its commitment to protecting the rights of the Ashkali community.

The Fjala Party has generally outlined six measures related to justice without providing specific explanations regarding their content and implementation.³¹

³⁰ *Electoral Political Program 2025-2028*; p. 99-100. Coalition for the Family; January 2025; (See: <https://heyzine.com/flip-book/0fa86d7e72.html>), (last accessed on 18 January 2025).

³¹ *Political Program of FJALA – Elections 2025*; Partia Fjala; January 2025; (See: <http://www.partiafjala.com/lajme/programi-politik-i-fjal%201%91s-zgjedhjet-2025-2/>), (last accessed 18 January 2025)

7. Good governance and human rights in political programs

7.1. Vetëvendosje Movement

The electoral program of the Vetëvendosje Movement for the 2025 general elections presents a one-sided and incomplete approach to the fundamental principles of good governance. At no point does it address public administration, institutional transparency, gender equality, accountability, or clean governance. The absence of these elements does not appear to be merely a technical omission, but a clear indication of a limited governance paradigm. As can be seen from reading the program, this movement reduces the program to a list of infrastructure projects, avoiding the discussion of key governance issues.

During the mandate of the Kurti 2 Government, reforms in public administration have been the subject of harsh criticism from international institutional organizations and civil society organizations in Kosovo. The Law on Public Officials and the Law on Salaries in the Public Sector were partially overturned, demonstrating the lack of a sustainable and inclusive approach to regulating the public system. These laws were important for increasing the efficiency and professionalization of public administration, but the process of drafting and approving them was characterized by unilateral decisions and in contradiction with constitutional principles and international standards. Instead of building a depoliticized and meritocratic public administration, the legislative process turned into a political battle that undermined the efforts for deep reform in public administration.

The Law on Salaries in the Public Sector remains fully unimplemented, due to the flagrant violation of the Constitutional Court's decision by the Government and the Assembly of Kosovo. Instead of implementing the Court's decision to set the value of work experience at 0.5% for each year, the Government and the Assembly adopted a discriminatory scheme, where for the first 15 years, experience is valued at only 0.25%, and only after this period the full percentage is applied.

The focus of the program on infrastructure projects, while sidelining reform in public administration, is a weak strategy that reflects a limited vision for the development of the country. Public administration is the foundation upon which efficient and accountable governance is built, and the neglect of this area in the electoral program is an alarming signal of the lack of will to ensure sustainable and transparent governance. While infrastructure projects are important, without a capable and independent administration, they risk being mismanaged and not achieve the intended impact on the country's development.

The lack of vision for public administration and good governance in the electoral program of the Vetëvendosje Movement is not simply forgetfulness, but a political choice that reflects the tendency to avoid issues that require accountability and institutional responsibility. This approach reduces the program to a catalog of projects which, without fundamental reforms, risk remaining unsustainable. Furthermore, the violation of Constitutional Court decisions and the distortion of key laws, such as the Law on Salaries in the Public Sector, demonstrate authoritarian behavior and a genuine lack of commitment to the rule of law. If this is the direction the future government intends to take, then the prospect of a responsible, meritocratic, and transparent administration remains bleak.

7.2. Democratic Party of Kosovo

In the electoral program of the DPK, it is noticeable that importance has been given to transparency as an aspect of good governance, where it is mentioned 17 times in 62 pages of the electoral program.

Transparency in public enterprises, transparency in education through performance indicators, transparency in environmental institutions, transparency in the vetting process as much as allowed by law, transparency in the work of the justice system, transparency in government actions, open dialogue and transparency with civil society, transparency and broad consultations with citizens on the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia are the indicators that the DPK has outlined for a good governance, should they be voted for by the citizens of Kosovo.

However, the issues mentioned in this program only reflect general situations and not concrete actions, as it is not specified what transparency in public enterprises entails, what is meant by governmental transparency, whether it refers to government decisions, documents such as draft laws and concept documents, which are already being published.

Meanwhile, on issues such as open dialogue and transparency with civil society, it is not specified what this promise entails, despite the fact that such promises are also legal obligations according to the Government's Rules of Procedure,³² and not merely a promise to gain the trust of the citizens. It is not possible to make a promise of transparency and broad consultations with citizens regarding the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, considering that the trust granted to a political party to govern the country is also the trust that it will engage in dialogue with Serbia and report to the Assembly of Kosovo before the deputies and citizens of Kosovo.

In two pages, DPK dedicated to public administration, with one of its goals being the restoration of the career system in the administration, eliminating the mandate system established by the current government³³, which according to the DPK has contributed to the politicization of the administration, while special attention will be given to creating a genuine performance evaluation system, which will begin with ministers and be implemented at all levels of administration. As for the performance of public administration, it is already regulated by sub-legal acts, but it has not been precisely indicated how the performance of the ministers will

32 Electoral Program 2025; Kosovo can do better; Bedri Hamza for Prime Minister, p. 59.

33 Electoral Program 2025; Kosovo can do better; Bedri Hamza for Prime Minister, p. 43.

be measured, considering that this is also regulated by the Law on the Government, in the sense that the Office of the Prime Minister according to this law is responsible for leading and coordinating the process of monitoring the performance of the Government.³⁴

It has been promised that the capacities of the Independent Oversight Council of the Civil Service will be increased, but this increase has not been specified, including what is the amount which will be increased in relation to the current budget and what for will those funds be spent on.

Regarding, the expansion of the range of training programs at the Kosovo Institute for Public Administration, the DPK does not specify which areas will be added, which areas the institute needs, and why these other fields should be included.

Regarding electronic governance and the digitization of administration, it is stated that they are essential for improving the quality of services that citizens receive and for the fight against corruption. However, it is still not specified how will they be simplified, when will implementation begin, how will costs be reduced, and no practical examples are provided for any service that will undergo changes, and in this program is not specified how will this measure reduce corruption.

The DPK's program is only general and does not provide a clear idea of how DPK plans for the public administration to look under its governance.

The Prime Minister candidate from the DPK, Bedri Hamza, promises that his program is achievable and will be implemented in his government by competent ministers, but in none of the pages it is stated that they must not be under criminal investigation, or to have never faced charges, or to have never been convicted.

In terms of public involvement in decision-making, only in one instance it is mentioned that civil society, experts, academics, the EU office, and embassies of friendly countries will be involved – specifically only in the promise to carry out full vetting in the justice system. This indicates that public involvement is limited and does not reflect a broad commitment to transparency and the participation of society in decision-making processes.

The governing program of the PDK does not treat gender equality as a clear and distinct priority, except for a general reference to women in the context of protecting inheritance rights. While the gradual increase in the number of notaries is mentioned, this is not sufficient to address the needs of gender equality in broader areas such as the economy, education, and politics. This implies that the PDK does not have a clear and comprehensive plan for advancing gender equality.

In their program for the February 9th elections, human rights are mentioned once in the chapter "*A prepared and strong Kosovo for any challenge*," where this issue is more closely related to security matters. The second mention of human rights is in the promise to build the Genocide

³⁴ Subparagraph 3.5 of Article 19, Law on the Government: Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo; (See link: <https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=66686>), (Accessed for the last time on January 18, 2025).

Memorial in Kosovo.³⁵

The DPK plans to implement human rights through Kosovo's engagement in international organizations such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE. This party mentions that these rights will be expanded also through Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe. For the last time, the DPK mentions human rights in measure 10 of the chapter on Kosovo's Foreign Policy, where it promises to promote and protect the interests and rights of minorities in the region through EU mechanisms, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE.

From reading this program, it is evident that there is a lack of direct focus on human rights. The focus on security causes a significant absence of emphasis on the social, cultural, and economic aspects of human rights. The program does not mention any concrete measures for addressing discrimination, gender equality, or the rights of vulnerable groups within Kosovo.

A separate chapter on the protection of human rights within the country should have been included in the report, including mechanisms for monitoring and implementation. The DPK's electoral program would have greatly benefited from the inclusion of a dedicated chapter solely focused on human rights, where clear commitments and measures for the protection and promotion of these rights would be outlined.

From reading the DPK's program, we can conclude that it is much more focused on promoting human rights at the international level, particularly through engagement in organizations such as the EU and the UN, but it has less focus on domestic needs and developments.

A positive aspect that can be mentioned is the clear commitment to the non-majority Serbian community, where this party clearly promises dialogue with this community to ensure their integration into the social and political life of Kosovo.³⁶

7.3. Democratic League of Kosovo

The Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) has made transparency one of the main principles of its electoral program for February 9th, treating it as an important element for institutional development and the fight against corruption. In this context, the DLK promises the amendment of the procurement law to increase efficiency, transparency, and support for local companies, as well as establish clear criteria for selecting companies for public projects.³⁷ However, the program fails to adequately clarify the specific challenges and problems of the current public procurement law, leaving a gap in describing the uncertainties and weaknesses that undermine the transparency and efficiency of the procedures.

DLK has prioritized digitization to improve public services and increase transparency in public administration. The program includes the creation of online platforms for tax registrations, license renewals, and the management of construction permits, aiming for a more efficient

35 Electoral Program 2025; Kosovo can do better; Bedri Hamza for Prime Minister, p. 49.

36 Electoral Program 2025; Kosovo can do better; Bedri Hamza for Prime Minister, p. 62.

37 *The Political Program of the Democratic League of Kosovo for the 2025 general parliamentary elections*, p. 45.

and accessible administration for citizens. Additionally, it also includes the digitization of educational texts and the measurement of performance in education to increase transparency and accountability. However, the program does not provide details on the financial cost and the resources needed for implementing the digitization projects, leaving uncertainty regarding their realization.

In justice, DLK aims to publish judicial documents on public platforms to ensure transparency and improve citizens' access to the judicial system. However, as seen, DLK either does not have accurate information that judicial documents are already published,³⁸ or has failed to clearly explain what their promise is on this matter.

The creation of platforms for managing construction permits is also a positive step aimed at increasing accountability and transparency. However, the lack of a clear plan for budget allocations and financial support for these measures could undermine the credibility of the program.

DLK LDK aims to modernize public administration by emphasizing transparency, accountability, and efficiency, as well as strengthening governance at the local level. Through this strategy, it aims for a fair distribution of projects and pensions, in line with the priorities of the municipalities. However, the program does not analyze the current state of public administration and does not provide information on the financial and human resources that will be used to achieve these objectives.

Regarding gender equality, DLK has included some initiatives in areas such as information technology, family, and foreign policy. However, the treatment of this issue remains superficial and does not address key matters such as equal pay, gender representation in leadership positions, and support for victims of violence. For a more comprehensive approach, the program should have dedicated a separate chapter to this topic.

In terms of governance and Euro-Atlantic integration, DLK proposes strengthening state institutions and protecting human rights as key elements for accelerating integration into the EU and NATO. One positive initiative is the constitutional amendment to guarantee the right to a safe and healthy environment.³⁹ However, the program does not mention the inclusion of non-majority communities in this process, which is crucial for the adoption of constitutional changes and ensuring inclusivity.

7.4. AAK-Nisma Coalition

The electoral program of AAK focuses on institutional and democratic consolidation through concrete measures which promote transparency, accountability, and active participation of citizens and organizations. It emphasizes the need to advance e-government, create a national platform for real-time monitoring of public spending, and develop a strategy for improving transparency in heavy industry and regional planning. While the program has clarity and a good

38 Kosovo Judicial Council; (See link: <https://www.gjyqesori-rks.org/>). (Accessed for the last time on January 18, 2025).

39 *The Political Program of the Democratic League of Kosovo for the 2025 general parliamentary elections*, p. 183.

focus on several areas, the lack of details on how to implement these measures and ensure effective coordination raises questions about the feasibility of achieving these objectives.

The electoral program of AAK for public administration focuses on improving efficiency and transparency, supporting projects that assess the quality of services and the performance of the administration through the evaluation of feedback.

AAK has promised to increase administration salaries annually, in line with economic growth and inflation. It will also support the development of small and medium-sized businesses, through legal reforms aimed at reducing barriers and costs for businesses. The goal is to reduce informality and corruption, while creating a more sustainable state-business partnership. However, the program does not provide sufficient details on how the state-business partnership will be realized, nor specific measures that will be taken to enhance the efficiency of the administration. While the increase in transparency and improvement of services in administration are presented as general priorities, there is a lack of a clear and detailed plan for implementing these measures during the mandate period. On the other hand, increasing salaries cannot not be a priority as now a standard has been established where based on the economic growth, the value of the coefficient for salaries in the public sector is determined.⁴⁰

The electoral program of AAK emphasizes the importance of strengthening independent institutions like the Ombudsperson and the Anti-Corruption Agency, but lacks concrete details on how this goal will be achieved. While it promises economic development and a fight against corruption, the connection between these policies and specific mechanisms remains unclear. International reports on corruption, codes of ethics, and consultations with the media and civil society are mentioned, but there is a lack of a direct focus on governance with clean hands and full integrity.

The program focuses on gender equality and support for women, emphasizing the balance between family life and careers, as well as creating professional opportunities. Support for projects aimed at sustainable employment and youth empowerment is mentioned as a priority. However, the program lacks concrete and clear measures for the implementation of these goals, leaving uncertainty about their realization.

Advancing the legal framework to encourage transparency, participation, and accountability in political processes is another goal of AAK. However, the program does not clarify the concrete measures for involving the public in legislative processes, and does not provide clarity on how these reforms will be implemented. The idea for a digital platform for transparency in public spending and government projects is promising, but it requires more details for practical implementation.

Despite the stated objectives, the program remains lacking in the description of concrete actions and the resources that will support the implementation of the proposed policies. The absence of a clear plan for financing and implementing the measures makes it difficult to assess the feasibility of achieving them.

40 Article 32, Law on Budgetary Allocations for the Year 2024: Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo; (See link: <https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=85052>), (Accessed for the last time on January 18, 2025).

In general, although the program includes important ideas for institutional empowerment, gender equality, and transparency, it needs to be supplemented with concrete strategies and clear steps to ensure the implementation of its objectives.

7.5. Coalition for Family

The electoral program of the "*Koalicioni për Familje*" (eng: Family Coalition) focuses on transparency and citizen engagement in addressing challenges in healthcare, justice, security, and the economy. The program includes commitments to an open process for evaluating leadership and management structures in key healthcare institutions, as well as the publication of budget expenditures and procurement procedures. While these are important steps, transparency in procurement and expenditure reporting is already practiced by some institutions, and a dedicated platform for procurement transparency is already in place. However, the program fails to clarify how these improvements will be concretely implemented, leaving uncertainty regarding its actual impact on governance transparency.

Regarding the justice system, while the program expresses a commitment to independence and transparency, it lacks specific details on the proposed reforms and how existing platforms will be improved. Overall, the proposals highlight key priorities, but there is a lack of concrete measures and implementation mechanisms.

The electoral program of the Coalition for Family aims to modernize public administration and enhance digital infrastructure, proposing the establishment of a State Institute for Information Technology⁴¹ to support administration and develop secure data centers in strategic locations. However, it lacks clarity on the implementation of the Law on Salaries, considering that this law is already in force. Additionally, its reference to the Law on Civil Service is outdated, as this law was replaced by the Law on Public Officials in 2023. While the program incorporates elements of the European agenda and Kosovo's integration objectives, it fails to specifically outline the existing problems and the necessary policy measures to address them.

The absence of a commitment in the electoral program of the Coalition for Family to exclude individuals with indictments, lack of integrity, or a criminal past from ministerial or prime ministerial appointments raises concerns about its prioritization of ethical standards for public office. The lack of an official statement in the program leaves no room for alternative interpretations, except that the coalition may include ministers or other officials with past corruption indictments or ongoing criminal proceedings.

7.6. Egyptian Liberal Party

The electoral program of the "*Partia Liberale Egjiptiane*" (eng: Egyptian Liberal Party) focuses on key issues such as gender equality and human rights, offering several specific commitments.

41 *Programi Politik Zgjedhor 2025-2028*; Koalicioni për Familjen; Janar 2025; (Shih linkun: <https://heyzine.com/flip-book/0fa86d7e72.html>), (Qasur për herë të fundit me 18 janar 2025)

The program proposes increasing women's representation in decision-making positions, protecting against gender discrimination, and developing policies that support women in business. Additionally, it includes measures to create market access for women's artisanal and agricultural products, as well as initiatives to prevent domestic violence and early marriages through awareness campaigns. In the human rights domain, the program pledges to introduce laws against hate speech and discrimination, monitor security and justice institutions, and strengthen mechanisms for the prevention and rehabilitation of children engaged in begging.

However, the program is limited, consisting of only three pages, and fails to address crucial governance issues such as good governance and transparency. It does not include commitments to accountability, the selection of ministers without criminal charges and with integrity, or measures to ensure clean governance and public reporting. Despite short sections on gender equality and human rights, their treatment remains superficial and lacks detail. This omission of fundamental priorities for transparent and honest governance makes the program incomplete and unbalanced, limiting its ability to comprehensively address the challenges faced by citizens and institutions.

7.7. PDAK-LPB

The electoral program of PDAK-LPB primarily focuses on promoting gender equality, emphasizing that the rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of women and men should be equal, regardless of gender. However, the program is very brief, consisting of only three pages, and does not address key governance aspects such as transparency, accountability, governance free from criminal charges, and ministerial integrity. While the program includes important measures for women's empowerment, such as amending laws on women's rights and supporting their participation in decision-making, it fails to specify which laws will be changed to achieve these goals. There is a clear commitment to gender equality, but more detail is needed to fully understand the concrete measures and their implementation.

The PDAK-LPB program also focuses on advancing human rights and improving living conditions for the Ashkali community, highlighting the need to uphold human rights standards and create employment opportunities.⁴² However, it lacks clarity in some aspects, such as specifying which laws will be upheld and what concrete measures will be taken to address human rights violations. The most specific part of the program includes building 400 houses, renovating homes for families in need, and improving infrastructure such as roads, sewage systems, public lighting, and electricity supply. However, there is no clear information on the costs of these measures, the specific locations of the projects, or the identification of areas with infrastructure deficiencies. To enhance clarity and feasibility, the program should provide more detailed information on specific locations and prioritize investments accordingly.

42 Political Program of PDAK-LPB, Unity Towards Success.

7.8. Serbian Democracy

The electoral program of Demokracia Serbe (Serbian Democracy) focuses on protecting the rights of Serbian citizens in Kosovo, advocating for freedom of expression, protest, and movement. It also aims to support the sustainable return of Serbs, calling for periodic reports on the Ministry's progress and urging EU engagement in monitoring this process. Another significant aspect is the creation of support mechanisms for the return of Serbs, but the use of terms such as "Kosovo and Metohija" is problematic and unacceptable, as it aligns with Serbia's political stance and contradicts Kosovo's Constitution. Such terminology suggests a continued denial of Kosovo's sovereignty by this political program.

Regarding reports from the Ministry for Communities and Return, this initiative could help monitor efforts to facilitate the return of Serbian citizens, but there is insufficient information on how these policies will be implemented. The rest of the program lacks a clear plan and structured activities to fulfill its promises, making it unclear how the stated objectives will be achieved and what concrete measures will be taken to support this process on the ground.

The monitoring of quotas for Serbian employment in central institutions is a positive initiative, but the party miscalculates the quota at 8.5%, whereas, according to the Law on Public Officials, the minimum quota for Serbian and other non-majority community representation is 10%. According to Article 10 of this law, this quota must be respected to ensure fair representation of minority groups in public administration, both at the central and local levels, reflecting the proportion of the respective population in each municipality.

Another issue is the lack of emphasis on essential aspects such as transparency in governance, public administration, and gender equality. These elements are crucial for building a democratic and stable society, yet Serbian Democracy appears to have left them out of its program. This omission renders the program incomplete and suggests that the party lacks a comprehensive vision for Kosovo's development as a modern and equal state for all its citizens.

7.9. New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo

"Iniciativa e Re Demokratike e Kosovës" (eng: the New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo IRDK) focuses on expanding opportunities for quality education and gender equality, with a commitment to empowering girls and women within the community. Through education and the promotion of gender equality, IRDK aims to prevent school dropouts and address issues related to women's participation in the labor market and gender-based violence policies. Additionally, the program is committed to increasing women's representation in politics and striving for a more equal society.

In the analysis of IRDK's program, it is observed that commitments to gender equality and education lack sufficient detail. While the promises are clear, concrete details on the implementation of these measures are missing. For example, no specific measures are outlined for preventing primary school dropouts, nor are accurate data provided on the number of children out of school or the reasons for girls' educational disadvantages. Without a more in-depth analysis of these aspects, it is difficult to predict the success of these commitments.

Furthermore, despite IRDK's promise to promote gender equality in the labor market, the program does not provide a clear action plan, leaving unclear how challenges faced by women—such as high unemployment rates and lack of equal opportunities—will be addressed. This represents a shortcoming in the program, as gender equality in employment requires a comprehensive approach, including training programs, support for women entrepreneurs, and labor policy reforms.

Another notable gap is the lack of details on combating gender-based violence. The program does not specify how these measures will be implemented—whether through advocacy activities, strengthening institutional capacities, or legal and budgetary measures. Additionally, the absence of a detailed plan for transparent governance and accountability is another missing aspect, which is crucial for an efficient and responsible administration.

7.10. Our Bosnian Coalition

The electoral program of "*Koalicionit ynë Boshnjak*" (eng: Our Bosnian Coalition) focuses on preserving and promoting the identity of Bosniaks in Kosovo, including commitments to respecting the Bosnian language in local administrations where it holds official status, translating official guidelines and documents into Bosnian, and strengthening ties with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The program also envisions support for Bosniak traditions, culture, and customs, along with initiatives to improve living conditions through the promotion of rural tourism, support for local businesses, and improvements in education. However, the program remains general and lacks key details, such as a clear representation of the Bosniak population and concrete measures for transparent and inclusive governance.

Firstly, the electoral program of Our Bosniak Coalition is a commendable effort to address the identity and language issues of Bosniaks, focusing on cultural and linguistic rights. The commitment to respecting the Bosnian language in administrations and translating official documents is a necessary measure for preserving cultural identity and facilitating access to public services. However, the lack of accurate data on the number of Bosniak citizens in Kosovo's municipalities represents a weakness in the program, as such information is crucial for policy planning and the development of appropriate measures.

Secondly, the program does not include proposals for broader reforms in public administration or transparent governance, which are essential for building lasting trust between the community and institutions. There are no commitments to appointing hand clean and corruption-free candidates or to implementing policies on gender equality and accountability.

Finally, despite its focus on important areas such as tourism and education, the program does not clearly outline measurable results it aims to achieve. The public and civil society need structured plans and clear timelines for the implementation of proposed measures. Moreover, the lack of a holistic approach that encompasses all aspects of community well-being makes the program more of a list of objectives rather than a concrete action plan. To gain greater trust and support, the coalition should enhance transparency and provide measurable and concrete details in its program.

7.11. Fjala Party

The electoral program of "*Partia Fjala*" (eng: Word) primarily focuses on sustainable economic development, infrastructure improvement, job and education opportunities, and support for vulnerable social groups. It aims to increase investments and improve conditions for businesses and individuals.⁴³ However, the program lacks emphasis on other key aspects of governance, such as transparent management of state institutions, a reformed and accountable public administration, and broader citizen involvement in legislative processes.

Despite its focus on key economic sectors, the program fails to present a clear vision for a clean and responsible administration. It does not address the importance of establishing a governance structure based on transparency and accountability before the citizens. Instead, its priorities are limited to economic and social challenges, neglecting necessary institutional reforms that could contribute to a more efficient and fair administration.

Also, the second critic Another major shortcoming is the lack of commitment to encourage a clean administration, with clean hands. None of the program's sections offer a detailed plan to combat corruption or reinforce mechanisms that ensure law enforcement without external influences or political favoritism.

Additionally, citizen participation in policymaking is insufficiently addressed. Without proper transparency and opportunities for the public to engage in decision-making processes, achieving sustainable and inclusive changes remains a challenge.

7.12. Unique Goran Party

The electoral program of the "*Partia e Bashkuar e Goranëve*" (eng: Unique Party of Gora – UPG) outlines several key priorities, including transparency in employment, the promotion of gender equality, and economic development, with a strong emphasis on supporting the local community and marginalized groups. The inclusion of affirmative action for youth and women is a commendable element, as it contributes to reducing social inequality. However, the program remains highly general and lacks detailed strategies and concrete policies for achieving these objectives, making it difficult to assess its feasibility for implementation.

On the other hand, the absence of focus on key issues such as good governance, public administration reforms, and accountability is a significant shortcoming. To gain public trust and meet citizens' expectations, PUG should introduce specific measures that address responsible administration and citizen participation in decision-making. A more detailed and balanced program, including mechanisms for implementing promises, would enhance the credibility and sustainability of the party's commitments.

43 *Programi Politik i FJAL S – Zgjedhjet 2025*; Partia Fjala; Janar 2025; (Shih linkun: <http://www.partiafjala.com/lajme/programi-politik-i-fjal%20s-zgjedhjet-2025-2/>), (Qasur për herë të fundit me 18 janar 2025)

7.13. Party for Freedom, Justice and Survival

The "*Partia për Liri, Drejtësi dhe Mbijetesë*" (eng: Party for Freedom, Justice, and Survival) has structured a political platform with promises that address important challenges for Kosovar society. While some aspects are positive and emphasize critical areas such as individual rights and freedoms, the inclusion of minority communities, and the promotion of cooperation, there are noticeable shortcomings in detailing the policies and concrete measures that will be used to achieve these goals.

The inclusion of a dedicated chapter on freedoms and individual rights appears to be a very positive aspect of the program. This also reflects the party's commitment to ensuring the protection of fundamental rights for every citizen. However, the program does not provide concrete details on how these rights will be protected and promoted in practice. Without clarity on the implementation of policies for safeguarding individual rights, this commitment remains more symbolic than operational.

The party also emphasizes its commitment to respecting the rights of non-majority communities and preserving Kosovo's natural resources and cultural heritage. This approach is positive, but the program does not specify which natural and heritage resources are being referred to or what specific measures will be taken to protect them. The public deserves more information to understand the significance and implementation of these policies.

Another point mentioned is the support for international and local institutions working to improve the conditions of non-majority communities. However, it is not clearly stated which specific policies will be followed to ensure equal inclusion and respect for their rights. The commitment is important, but the lack of clarity in the program's implementation may create uncertainty about its objectives and outcomes.

The party highlights the challenges faced by representatives of the Serbian community, such as the lack of full representation and the realization of political rights.⁴⁴ While it is positive that these challenges are acknowledged and addressed, the program does not provide details on how full representation will be achieved or what mechanisms will be used to guarantee the political rights of this community. Furthermore, in all instances where the representation of non-majority communities is mentioned, specific details are lacking on how sustainable and effective mechanisms for their inclusion in decision-making processes will be established.

A significant shortcoming of the program is its failure to address other critical issues such as public administration, transparent governance, accountability, gender equality, and governance with integrity. The inclusion of these topics would be essential for creating a comprehensive and inclusive program that reflects the needs of Kosovo's citizens and aligns with modern democratic governance standards.

44 *Political Program; Program for Democratic Society of Kosovo; Party for Freedom, Justice and Survival* (eng: Program for a Democratic Society of Kosovo by the Party for Freedom, Justice, and Survival; January 2025; (See link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/136CJhO2O7y4sBJS9Y_6YnnUtyFuZ0kfg/view?fbclid=IwY2xjawlJuhleHRuA2FibQlxMQABHfVe6JuYczxan-vUnl4l-Jfvqqc42UlfYrfX66idnXlHTQoVqS5iVUwPQ9A_aem_mUgMPf1NVsV6Rn-wWOk00Q).

